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In a seminal paper, Lin and Reiter introduced a model-theoretic deﬁnition for the
progression of a basic action theory in the situation calculus, and proved that it implies the
intended properties. They also showed that this deﬁnition comes with a strong negative
result, namely that for certain cases ﬁrst-order logic is not expressive enough to correctly
characterize the progressed theory and second-order axioms are necessary. However, they
also considered an alternative simpler deﬁnition according to which the progressed theory
is always ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. They conjectured that this alternative deﬁnition is incorrect
in the sense that the progressed theory is too weak and may sometimes lose information.
This conjecture and the status of the deﬁnability of progression in ﬁrst-order logic has
remained open since. In this paper we present two signiﬁcant results about this alternative
deﬁnition of progression. First, we prove the Lin and Reiter conjecture by presenting a case
where the progressed theory indeed does lose information, thus closing a question that has
remained open for more than ten years. Second, we prove that the alternative deﬁnition
is nonetheless correct for reasoning about a large class of sentences, including some that
quantify over situations.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The situation calculus is a logical language that is specially designed for reasoning about action and change [4,5]. A basic
action theory is a situation calculus theory that describes what holds initially in the world as well as how the world evolves
under the effects of actions. An example of a basic action theory is one that captures the dynamics of a board game: part of
the theory, the initial knowledge base, describes the initial positions of the pieces on the board, and the rest of the theory
characterizes the legal moves of the game and the effects (and non-effects) of performing those moves.
A fundamental problem in the ﬁeld of reasoning about action and change is to determine whether or not some condition
holds after a given sequence of actions has been performed. In other words, we start in an initial situation S0, we perform a
sequence of actions α1, . . . ,αn taking us to a new situation Sn , and we wish to know if the condition holds in Sn . There are
in fact two versions of this problem. The special case where the condition only refers to Sn is called the (simple) projection
problem [5]. For example, we might want to know if a game piece is at a certain location after the moves α1, . . . ,αn have
✩ This paper revises results that ﬁrst appeared in Vassos and Levesque (2008) [1]. The title follows the line of work of Lin and Reiter (1995, 1997) [2,3].
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might want to know if a game piece can ever get to a certain location after these moves have been performed. This sort of
reasoning, which we call the generalized projection problem, is a prerequisite to other forms of reasoning in dynamic domains
such as planning and high-level program execution [6].
The simple projection problem can be solved by regression or by progression [7]. Roughly speaking, regression involves
taking the condition about Sn and transforming it to an equivalent one about S0 where we can use the initial knowledge
base to answer the question; progression, on the other hand, involves replacing the initial knowledge base in the basic
action theory by a new knowledge base that captures the facts that hold in Sn .
For the generalized problem, where the condition may refer to the future of Sn , the case is less clear. A model-theoretic
deﬁnition of progression in the situation calculus that does the trick was ﬁrst proposed by Lin and Reiter [3]. However,
their deﬁnition comes with a strong negative result: for certain kinds of basic action theories, ﬁrst-order logic is not ex-
pressive enough and second-order logic is needed. Nonetheless, their result did not preclude the possibility of other forms
of progression that could still allow us to solve the generalized problem while remaining ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. In particular,
one possible candidate for the new knowledge base is the inﬁnite set of all those ﬁrst-order sentences about Sn that are
entailed by the original theory.
While this alternative ﬁrst-order deﬁnition of progression clearly captures what holds in Sn , it is not clear whether it
is suﬃcient to characterize the future of Sn , even in combination with the rest of the basic action theory. Lin and Reiter
conjectured that this form of progression was too weak. It has been an open problem whether this conjecture is true or
false, rendering unclear also the question whether there can be a correct progression that solves the generalized problem
and is also ﬁrst-order deﬁnable.
In this paper we present two major results. First, we give a proof for the Lin and Reiter conjecture: a progression based
on the alternative ﬁrst-order deﬁnition is indeed too weak for characterizing the future of Sn . We provide a basic action
theory and a sentence about the future of Sn that demonstrate this. This is a major result that further supports the claim by
Lin and Reiter that the progression of unrestricted basic action theories cannot be formalized correctly in ﬁrst-order logic.
The second result is more positive. Lin and Reiter showed that the alternative ﬁrst-order progression is correct for the
simple projection problem [3]. Here we prove that it is also correct for a much wider class of sentences including sentences
of the form “after α, property φ will always be true”. This result establishes that this form of progression is actually more
useful than what was originally believed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we review some preliminaries about the situation calcu-
lus and the basic action theories. In Section 4 we introduce the notion of a correct progression and deﬁne strong progression,
an adapted formulation of the deﬁnition of progression by Lin and Reiter. Sections 5 and 6 contain the main contributions of
this paper. In Section 5 we introduce weak progression, a formulation of the alternative ﬁrst-order deﬁnition of progression,
and give a proof for the conjecture by Lin and Reiter that weak progression is not correct in the general case (Theorem 2).
In Section 6 we show that weak progression is correct when we restrict our attention to a wide class of sentences (Theo-
rem 3). In Section 7 we review related work and in Section 8 we give some concluding remarks about the consequences of
our results.
Finally, in Appendix A we discuss some subtle details about the deﬁnitions for progression that appear in [3] and [5],
and we illustrate a problem in the deﬁnition of [5], while in Appendices B and C we give the proof of some lemmas that
are long and tedious.
2. Situation calculus
The language L of the situation calculus as presented by Reiter [5] is a three-sorted ﬁrst-order logic language with
equality and some limited second-order features. The three sorts are the following: action for actions, situation for situations,
and a catch-all sort object for everything else depending on the domain of application.
Similar to a normal one-sorted ﬁrst-order language, L includes function and predicate symbols. In this case since there
are three sorts, each of the symbols has a type that speciﬁes the sorts for the arguments it takes. The situation calculus
includes symbols only of certain types each of which has a special role in the representation of the world and its dynamics.
One thing to note before moving to the formal details is that a situation is used to represent a world history as a sequence
of actions, and the symbols that take arguments of sort situation are used to formalize the dynamics of the world.
The language of the situation calculus L includes the logical symbols ¬,∧,∃, the symbol of equality =, and the following
non-logical symbols:
• a countably inﬁnite supply of variables for each of the three sorts, as well as a countably inﬁnite supply of (second-
order) predicate variables of all arities;
• a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of constant symbols of sort object;
• for each n  1, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of object function symbols, or simply function symbols, of type
(action∪ object)n → object;
• for each n 0, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of action function symbols of type (action∪ object)n → action;
• the special situation function symbol do :action× situation→ situation and the constant S0;
• for each n 0, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of predicate symbols of type (action∪ object)n;
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• for each n 0, a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite number of relational ﬂuent symbols of type (action∪ object)n × situation.
The terms of the language are deﬁned inductively similarly to a normal one-sorted language but also respecting the type
of each symbol with respect to the three different sorts. We adopt the following notations with subscripts and superscripts:
α and a for terms and variables of sort action; σ and s for terms and variables of sort situation; t and x, y, z, w for terms
and variables of sort object. Also, we will use A for action functions, F , G for relational ﬂuents, and b, c,d, e for constants
of sort object.
An action term or simply an action represents an atomic action that may be performed in the world. For example
consider the action move(x, y) that may be used to represent that item x is moved to location y. A situation term or simply
a situation represents a world history as a sequence of actions. The constant S0 is used to denote the initial situation where
no actions have occurred. Sequences of actions are built using the function symbol do, such that do(α,σ ) represents the
successor situation resulting from performing action α in situation σ .
A relational ﬂuent is a predicate whose last argument is a situation, and thus whose truth value can change from situation
to situation. For example, At(x, y, σ ) may be used to represent that item x is at location y in situation σ . In order to
simplify the analysis we have restricted L so that there are no functional ﬂuent symbols in L, that is, functions whose
last argument is a situation. This is not a restriction on the expressiveness of L as functional ﬂuents can be represented by
relational ﬂuents with a few extra axioms. The normal predicates and functions that do not take arguments of sort situation
are used to represent relations and functions that are rigid and remain the same for all situations.
Actions need not be executable in all situations, and the predicate atom Poss(α,σ ) states that action α is executable in
situation σ . For example, Poss(move(x, y),σ ) is intended to represent that the action move(x, y) is possible in situation σ .
Finally, the binary predicate symbol  provides an ordering on situations. The atom σ  σ ′ means that the action sequence
σ ′ can be obtained from the sequence σ by performing one or more actions in σ . We will typically use the notation σ  σ ′
as a macro for σ  σ ′ ∨ σ = σ ′ .
The well-formed ﬁrst-order formulas of L are deﬁned inductively similarly to a normal one-sorted language but also
respecting that each parameter has a unique sort. As far as the second-order formulas of L are concerned, only quantiﬁ-
cation over relations is allowed and the well-formed formulas are deﬁned inductively similarly to a normal second-order
language. The semantics of the situation calculus language is the standard model-theoretic Tarskian semantics. We assume
that the reader is familiar with the notions of a structure, a model, satisfaction in a structure, and entailment. For the formal
deﬁnitions the reader is referred to one of the standard textbooks for mathematical logic, such as [8] and [9]. Finally, to
avoid confusion we note that whenever we say that two formulas are logically equivalent we assume that the logical symbol
= is always interpreted as the true identity.
Now we move on to see the speciﬁcs of the basic action theories, a special kind of situation calculus theories that
represent the world and its dynamics.
3. Basic action theories
The language of the situation calculus provides the vocabulary that is needed to represent how properties of the world
change under the effect of actions: the changing properties are represented as ﬂuents, which are conditioned on a situation
argument, and the dynamics is represented using rules that specify how the truth value of each ﬂuent changes from any
situation s to do(a, s), i.e., the situation after the action a has been performed.
This representation task is tricky and requires solving a few problems that have been examined extensively in the
literature, such as the qualiﬁcation problem, the ramiﬁcation problem, and the frame problem [4]. We will be dealing with
situation calculus theories of a special kind, the so-called basic action theories [5], that provide an effective solution to the
frame problem and a simple solution to the qualiﬁcation problem that works for many practical scenarios. These theories
consist mainly of two parts: (i) a set of logical formulas that represent the initial state of the world and (ii) a set of logical
rules that represent how certain facts about the world change when actions are performed.
Before we proceed to the formal deﬁnition of a basic action theory we need to deﬁne the formulas that are uniform in σ
as follows.
Deﬁnition 1. (See [3,5].) For any situation term σ , we deﬁne Lσ to be the subset of the well-formed formulas of L (both
ﬁrst-order and second-order) that do not mention the predicates Poss or , do not quantify over variables of sort situation,
do not mention equality on situations, and whenever they mention a term of sort situation in the situation argument
position of a ﬂuent, then that term is σ . When a formula φ(σ ) is in Lσ we say that it is uniform in σ [5].
The deﬁnition of a basic action theory follows. Note that for the sake of readability we will typically omit the leading
universal quantiﬁers in the axioms of the theory.
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D =Dap ∪Dss ∪Duna ∪D0 ∪Dfnd,
where each of the parts of D is as follows.
1. Dap is a set of action precondition axioms (APs), one for each action function symbol A, of the following form:
Poss
(
A(
x), s)≡ ΠA(
x, s),
where ΠA(
x, s) is a ﬁrst-order formula uniform in s that does not mention any free variable other than 
x, s. The action
precondition axiom deﬁnes the preconditions to the executability of an action in a given situation in terms of properties
holding in that situation alone.
2. Dss is a set of successor state axioms (SSAs), one for each relational ﬂuent symbol F , of the following form:
F
(
x,do(a, s))≡ ΦF (
x,a, s),
where ΦF (
x,a, s) is a ﬁrst-order formula uniform in s that does not mention any free variable other than 
x,a, s. The
successor state axiom for the ﬂuent symbol F characterizes the conditions under which F has a speciﬁc truth value for

x in the situation do(a, s) as a function of the situation s.
3. Duna is the set of unique-names axioms for actions: A(
x) = A′(
y), and A(
x) = A(
y) ⊃ 
x = 
y, for each pair of distinct
action function symbols A and A′ .
4. D0 is a set of ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in S0 that describe the state of the world in the initial situation when no
action has been performed. We will typically refer to this set as the initial knowledge base (KB).
5. Dfnd is the following set of domain independent foundational axioms that formally deﬁne the space of situations and
the ordering :
do(a, s) = do(a′, s′)⊃ (a = a′ ∧ s = s′),
∀P(P (S0) ∧ ∀a∀s(P (s) ⊃ P(do(a, s)))⊃ ∀sP (s)),
¬s S0,
s  do(a, s′)≡ s s′ ∨ s = s′.
Note that Dfnd is the only place where a second-order axiom is used, namely the second axiom that quantiﬁes over the
second-order predicate variable P . The purpose of this axiom is to ensure that the domain of situations is the smallest set
that includes the initial situation and situations that are built using the function do, thus ensuring that when we quantify
over situations we only refer to situations that are reachable from S0 by a ﬁnite number of applications of the function do.
We now proceed to deﬁne the problem of progression for such theories.
4. The problem of progression
The progression of a basic action theory is the problem of updating the initial knowledge base so that it reﬂects the
current state of the world after some actions have been performed, instead of the initial state of the world. In other words,
in order to do a one-step progression of the basic action theory D with respect to the ground action α we need to replace
D0 in D by a suitable set Dα of sentences so that the original theory D and the theory (D−D0)∪Dα are equivalent with
respect to how they describe the situation do(α, S0) and the situations in the future of do(α, S0) [3]. For readability reasons
we will typically use Sα to denote the situation term do(α, S0).
As we will be interested in identifying classes of sentences that can be correctly evaluated by the updated theory
(D−D0) ∪Dα , we introduce the notion of a correct progression as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 (Correct progression). Let D be a basic action theory, α a ground action term, and Dα3 a set of (ﬁrst-order or
second-order) sentences uniform in Sα . We say that Dα is a correct progression of D0 wrt α, D, and the set of sentences Z
iff for every sentence φ in Z ,
D | φ iff (D−D0) ∪Dα | φ.
2 We slightly deviate from the standard notation in [5] as we use D0 instead of DS0 and Dfnd instead of Σ . In the ﬁrst case we use D0 in order to
avoid using a symbol with a subscript (S0) as a subscript of D. In the second case we choose to use Dfnd for purposes of uniformity in the parts of D.
Finally, note that even though we do not use a different symbol like Reiter [5], here it is also the case that Dfnd is identical in all basic action theories.
3 Similar to what we did in Deﬁnition 2 we slightly deviate from the notation of Lin and Reiter [3] and use Dα instead of DSα in order to avoid using a
symbol with a subscript as a subscript of D.
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all those ﬁrst-order sentences whose truth value depends only on Sα and situations in the future of Sα .
In a seminal paper Lin and Reiter [3] gave a model-theoretic deﬁnition for the progression Dα of D0 wrt α and D that
achieves this goal. Their deﬁnition essentially requires for the two theories D and (D −D0) ∪Dα that any model of one
is indistinguishable from some model of the other with respect to how they interpret the situations in Sα and the future
of Sα . Using this property then one can prove that a set Dα that follows their deﬁnition of progression is correct wrt any
set of ﬁrst-order sentences whose truth value depends only on Sα and situations in the future of Sα .
In the same paper Lin and Reiter showed that if we assume a ﬁnite number of predicates, functions, and ﬂuents in L,
and a ﬁnite D0, then we can always use second-order logic to specify a set Dα that qualiﬁes as a progression according
to their deﬁnition. In particular, Lin and Reiter showed how to construct a second-order sentence which along with the set
Duna is a progression according to their model-theoretic deﬁnition.
As it is often easier to work with a second-order sentence than a model-theoretic relation between logical theories,
we chose to use a deﬁnition of progression that is based on this result by Lin and Reiter. Our deﬁnition, namely strong
progression, is essentially the original deﬁnition of progression by Lin and Reiter [3] slightly adapted to comply with the
newer form of basic action theories that do not use Poss in the successor state axioms, and expressed in the second-order
counterpart that was identiﬁed by Lin and Reiter. For a more detailed discussion about the syntactic and aesthetic differences
between the deﬁnitions of progression as they appear in [3,5], and in this paper, the reader is referred to Appendix A.
We now go over the intuition behind the second-order characterization of progression, and introduce the notation that
we will use in our deﬁnition.
Let F1, . . . , Fn be the ﬂuent symbols of L, D be a basic action theory with a ﬁnite D0, and α a ground action term.
Also assume that the successor state axiom for Fi is of the form Fi(
x,do(a, s)) ≡ Φi(
x,a, s). We want to ﬁnd a set Dα that
successfully describes the situation Sα . Observe that D already tells us what is known about the situation Sα : D0 tells what
is known about S0, and the successor state axioms tell us how each ﬂuent changes in going from S0 to Sα . So in a sense,
the set
D0 ∪
{
n∧
i=1
∀
x.Fi(
x, Sα) ≡ Φi(
x,α, S0)
}
qualiﬁes as the set Dα we are looking for, except for the fact that it also includes what is known about S0, therefore is
not uniform in Sα . The progression we propose removes the dependency on S0 by using second-order quantiﬁcation over
predicates in order to express the information about S0, instead of using the original set D0 as is. The resulting sentence is
then uniform in Sα . More precisely, we introduce the following notation that is similar to the so-called second-order lifting
of Lin and Reiter [3].
Deﬁnition 4. Let F1, . . . , Fn be relational ﬂuent symbols, and Q 1, . . . , Qn be second-order (non-ﬂuent) predicate variables.
For any ﬁrst-order formula φ in L, let φ〈
F : 
Q 〉 be the formula that results from replacing any ﬂuent atom Fi(t1, . . . , tn, σ )
in φ, where σ is a situation term, by Q i(t1, . . . , tn).
The trick here is that we drop situation terms from all ﬂuent atoms that are mentioned in φ and replace each ﬂuent
atom with a second order predicate variable. The resulting formula is then uniform in any situation term. We will use this
notation as follows to deﬁne a second-order sentence uniform in Sα that will be the basis of our deﬁnition for progression.
Deﬁnition 5. Let F1, . . . , Fn be all the relational ﬂuent symbols of L and D a basic action theory, where D0 is a ﬁnite set
of ﬁrst-order sentences, φ is the conjunction of the sentences in D0, and for all i, 1 i  n, the successor state axiom for
Fi has the form Fi(
x,do(a, s)) ≡ Φi(
x,a, s). Let α be a ground action term, and Q 1, . . . , Qn be predicate variables. Then,
Pro(D,α) is the following second-order sentence uniform in Sα :
∃ 
Q .φ〈
F : 
Q 〉 ∧
n∧
i=1
∀
x.Fi(
x, Sα) ≡
(
Φi(
x,α, S0)〈
F : 
Q 〉
)
.
Now we are ready to give the precise deﬁnition of strong progression.
Deﬁnition 6 (Strong progression). Let L be a situation calculus language with a ﬁnite number of predicate, function, and
ﬂuent symbols, D a basic action theory over L with a ﬁnite D0, α a ground action term, and Dα a set of sentences uniform
in Sα . The set Dα is a strong progression of D0 wrt α and D iff Dα ∪Duna is logically equivalent4 to {Pro(D,α)} ∪Duna .
4 As we mentioned earlier, whenever we say that two formulas are logically equivalent we assume that the logical symbol = is always interpreted as the
true identity.
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use the simpler condition that Dα be logically equivalent to Pro(D,α), is that Duna is needed in order to get a correct
characterization of the situation Sα but since it is already included in D we don’t want to assume that Duna is also included
in Dα .
As far as the correctness of a strong progression Dα is concerned, following the proof of result [3, Theorem 2] we can
show for the two theories D and (D−D0) ∪Dα that any model of one is indistinguishable from some model of the other
with respect to how they interpret the situations in Sα and the future of Sα , and use this property to prove that Dα is
correct wrt any set of ﬁrst-order sentences whose truth value depends only on Sα and situations in the future of Sα . In
particular, the following theorem is a reformulation of result [3, Theorem 1] expressed in terms of our deﬁnition of strong
progression.
Theorem 1. (See [3].) Let L be a situation calculus language with a ﬁnite number of predicate, function, and ﬂuent symbols, and D a
basic action theory over L such thatD0 is ﬁnite. Let α be a ground action term, andDα a strong progression ofD0 wrt α andD. Then,
for every sentence φ uniform in Sα (ﬁrst-order or second-order),D | φ iffDα ∪Duna | φ .
This result implies the following for the correctness of strong progression according to Deﬁnition 3.
Corollary 1 (Strong progression is correct wrt LSα ). Let L, D, and α be as in Theorem 1, and Dα a strong progression of D0 wrt α
and D. Then, Dα is a correct progression of D0 wrt α, D, and LSα , where LSα is the set of (ﬁrst-order or second-order) sentences
uniform in do(α, S0).
Although the deﬁnition of strong progression is formulated in second-order logic, like Lin and Reiter we are concerned
with ﬁnding progressions that can be expressed in ﬁrst-order logic. It is not hard to see that in simple cases that are used
in practice (such as STRIPS planning [10]), this deﬁnition does the right thing and remains within ﬁrst-order logic. However,
as it was ﬁrst shown in [3], there are cases of basic action theories where no ﬁrst-order strong progression exists. In the
next section we examine the ﬁrst-order deﬁnability of a progression that is also correct in the general case.
We close this section with a remark about the requirement that Dα should be uniform in Sα . Strictly speaking the new
theory (D−D0)∪Dα is not a basic action theory according to Deﬁnition 2 because the updated knowledge base Dα is not
uniform in S0. Nonetheless, getting a basic action theory in the formal sense is a simple matter of replacing Sα by S0 in all
the sentences in Dα . The reason why Dα is typically assumed in the literature to be uniform in Sα is that it simpliﬁes the
analysis, as we don’t need to change our “S0 point of reference” when we examine the original and the progressed theory.
5. On the ﬁrst-order deﬁnability of progression
Even though the deﬁnition of strong progression uses second-order logic, we are interested in ﬁnding a ﬁrst-order set
Dα that qualiﬁes as a strong progression of D0. In some cases this is feasible but as it was ﬁrst shown by Lin and Reiter
[3] there are cases where no ﬁrst-order strong progression exists. It has been unclear whether this is a problem of the
particular deﬁnition of strong progression or if it is an inherent diﬃculty of the problem of progression. In other words, it
has been an open question whether there is an alternative (weaker) deﬁnition for Dα according to which Dα is always
ﬁrst-order deﬁnable and is also correct in the general case.
In fact there is a straightforward alternative deﬁnition for Dα that is always ﬁrst-order. The idea is to let Dα be the
inﬁnite set of ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα that are entailed by D [11]. The intuition is that if we replace D0 by a set
Dα that is strong enough to entail all the ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα that the original theory entails, then it should
follow that (D −D0) ∪Dα also entails the same ﬁrst-order sentences about the future of Sα as the original theory D. We
call this alternative deﬁnition of progression weak progression and in order to avoid confusion with strong progression we
will be using Fα to refer to a weak progression of D0 wrt α.
Deﬁnition 7 (Weak progression). Let D be a basic action theory, α a ground action term, and Fα a set of ﬁrst-order sentences
uniform in Sα . The set Fα is a weak progression of D0 wrt α and D iff for all ﬁrst-order sentences φ uniform in Sα ,
Fα ∪Duna | φ iff D | φ.
If we could prove that a weak progression of D0 is correct in the general case then this deﬁnition would be the preferred
option, as strong progression is much more cumbersome to work with and also comes with the strong negative result that
second-order logic may be necessary in some cases. Following intuitions and results in [12] Lin and Reiter conjectured that
we can ﬁnd counter examples which show that a weak progression is not correct in the general case. In this section we will
identify such an example and prove the conjecture, thus showing that weak progression is indeed too weak.
In order to be precise in our formulation of the conjecture and our proof, we will now introduce the set LFσ that includes
a wide range of ﬁrst-order sentences whose truth value depends only on σ and situations in the future of σ . For a sentence
φ in LFσ we will typically say that φ is about the future of σ . Note though that we do not imply that any ﬁrst-order property
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using in this section to prove the conjecture by showing that in general a weak progression is not correct wrt LFσ .
We ﬁrst introduce some notation to specify sequences of actions and situation terms that are rooted at some other
situation term, similarly to [13,5].
Deﬁnition 8. (See [5,13].) Let σ be a situation term and δ be a (possibly empty) vector of action terms 〈α1, . . . ,αn〉. We use
do(δ,σ ) to denote the following situation: do(αn,do(αn−1, . . . ,do(α1, σ ) . . .)). We say that a situation term κ is rooted at σ
iff κ is syntactically the same term as do(δ,σ ), for some vector of action terms δ.
The intuition is that a situation term κ is rooted at some other situation term σ iff κ can be obtained from σ by
“adding” a sequence of actions using the function do.
We will also need to restrict our attention to formulas that only refer to some situation term σ and possible futures
of σ . For this purpose we introduce the next deﬁnition using the notion of rooted situation terms.
Deﬁnition 9 (LFσ ). Let σ , κ be situation terms and φ a rectiﬁed5 formula in L. We say that κ is in the future of σ in φ iff one
of the following holds6:
• κ is σ , or
• κ is rooted at some situation term κ ′ that is in the future of σ in φ, or
• κ is a variable and ∀κ(κ ′  κ ⊃ β) or ∃κ(κ ′  κ ∧ β) is a sub-formula of φ, where κ ′ is a situation term that is in the
future of σ in φ.
We say that the formula φ is about the future of σ iff the situation terms in φ that appear as arguments of Poss or some
ﬂuent or the equality predicate are all in the future of σ in φ. We deﬁne LFσ as the set of all rectiﬁed sentences φ in L
such that φ is about the future of σ .
The intuition is that if a sentence is about the future of Sα then its truth depends only on Sα and situations that come
after Sα . An example follows.
Example 1. Let φ(s) be a (ﬁrst-order or second-order) formula uniform in s. Then the following sentence is about the
future of Sα and expresses that φ(s) holds in all situations that are rooted at Sα : ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ φ(s)). The third point in the
previous deﬁnition speciﬁes a way that sub-formulas about the future may be combined in an inductive way. For instance,
the following sentence is about the future of Sα as well and expresses that for every situation s rooted at Sα there is a
situation s′ rooted at s such that φ(s′) holds: ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ ∃s′(s  s′ ∧ φ(s′))). Finally, note that none of the sentences we
examined in this example are uniform in any situation term σ .
We can now state the conjecture by Lin and Reiter [3] in an equivalent way using the terminology that we have intro-
duced in this paper.
Conjecture 1. (See [3].) There is a situation calculus languageLwith a ﬁnite number of predicate, function, and ﬂuent symbols, a basic
action theoryD over L with a ﬁniteD0 , and a ground action term α, such that the following holds: if Fα is a weak progression ofD0
wrt α andD then Fα is not a correct progression wrt α,D, and LFσ , where σ is do(α, S0).
We now proceed to the proof of this conjecture.
5.1. Weak progression is not correct wrt LFSα
In this section we give a proof of Conjecture 1 thus resolving the open question whether a weak progression is a correct
progression in the general case. In particular, we will present a basic action theory D and a weak progression Fα such that
(D−D0)∪Fα fails to entail a sentence φ∗ about the future of Sα that is nonetheless entailed by the original theory D. The
proof is based on the notion of unnamed objects that we will be deﬁning shortly. We start by presenting the basic action
theory that we will use for the proof.
Deﬁnition 10 (The inﬁnite doors domain). Let L be the situation calculus language that consists of the standard logical
symbols and the symbols Poss,do, S0, the ﬂuent F (x, s), the action constants A, B , the object function n(x), and the object
5 A formula is rectiﬁed iff no variable occurs both bound and free, and all quantiﬁers in the formula refer to different variables.
6 Strictly speaking we only care about future situations s that are executable in the sense of satisfying this formula: ∀a.∀s∗.do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ Poss(a, s∗).
A more reﬁned deﬁnition would include this constraint but is not necessary for our analysis.
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parts of D is as follows.
1. Dap consists of the following two sentences:
Poss(A, s) ≡ true, (1)
Poss(B, s) ≡ true. (2)
2. Dss consists of the following sentence:
F
(
x,do(a, s)
)≡ a = A ∧ x = 0∨
a = B ∧ ¬F (x, s) ∧ ∃y(x = n(y) ∧ F (y, s)). (3)
3. Duna consists of the following sentence:
A = B. (4)
4. D0 consists of the following sentences:
∀a(a = A ∨ a = B), (5)
∀x(x = 0 ≡ ∃y n(y) = x), (6)
∀x∀y(n(x) = n(y) ⊃ x = y), (7)
F (0, S0) ∧ ∀x
(
F (x, S0) ⊃ F
(
n(x), S0
))
, (8)
∃x ¬F (x, S0). (9)
5. Dfnd is as in Deﬁnition 2.
In the inﬁnite doors domain there is an inﬁnite number of doors that are located one next to the other. The ﬂuent F (x, s)
represents that the object x, i.e., the door x, is open in the situation s. The door 0 is the ﬁrst door in the chain and the
function n(x) denotes the door that is next to the door x. The sentences (6) and (7) in D0 ensure that for every door x,
there is a unique door that is next to x and a unique door y such that x is next to y, except for door 0 that is the ﬁrst door
in the chain. Note then that all models of D0 must have an inﬁnite object domain and contain at least an inﬁnite chain of
doors.
The basic action theory D of the inﬁnite doors domain was carefully deﬁned so that all the models of D satisfy two
properties that we will take advantage of in the sequel. Before we state the properties we need to introduce the notion of
named and unnamed objects as follows.
Deﬁnition 11. Let L be the language of the inﬁnite doors domain, GT the set of all the ground terms of sort object in L,
and M an L-structure. For every q in the object domain of M we say that q is named iff there is a term t in GT such that
t is interpreted as q in M , and unnamed otherwise. Also, we say that M is a term structure iff all the elements of the object
domain of M are named.
The ﬁrst property of D is due to the initial knowledge base D0 that can only be satisﬁed in models with at least one
unnamed object. In particular, D0 is deﬁned so that there exists a door that is different than any door in the inﬁnite chain
of doors that start from the door zero.
Lemma 1. LetD be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain. No model ofD is a term structure.
Proof. Observe that each of the ground terms of sort object in the language has the form nk(0), i.e., it is constructed by a
ﬁnite number of applications of the function n to the constant 0. By induction on the construction of ground terms of sort
object it follows that if M satisﬁes the sentence (8) then for all named objects q and an arbitrary variable assignment μ,
M,μxq | F (x, S0).
The sentence (9) on the other hand is satisﬁed only in a structure M that has an element q′ in the object domain such that
M,μxq′ | F (x, S0).
Therefore, the set {(8), (9)} can only be satisﬁed in a structure that has an unnamed object. 
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domain changing their status so that in the resulting situation exactly one of them is open, namely the door 0. Every time a
series of actions B is performed after A, in the resulting situation there is exactly one door that is open which is identiﬁed
as follows.
Lemma 2. LetD be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain, M a model ofD, μ an arbitrary variable assignment, and S A
a macro for the situation term do(A, S0). For every action sequence δ, M,μxq | F (x,do(δ, S A)) iff q is the denotation of nk(0), where
k is the number of B actions that appear after the last occurrence of the action A in 〈A, δ〉, and n0(0) = 0.
Proof. First, observe that the sentences (6) and (7) in D0 ensure the uniqueness of names for the ground terms of sort
object. We will prove the lemma by induction on the number k of B actions that appear after the last occurrence of the
action A in 〈A, δ〉. The base case is when k = 0, which means that A is the last action in 〈A, δ〉. In this case it follows by the
successor state axiom for F , i.e., sentence (3), that F is false in do(δ, S A) for all the elements of the object domain except
for the denotation of 0, therefore the lemma holds. For the induction step we assume that the lemma holds for k and prove
for k + 1. By the induction hypothesis it follows that
M,μxq | F
(
x,do(δ, S A)
)
iff q is the denotation of nk(0). It follows that
M,μxyqr | ¬F
(
x,do(δ, S A)
)∧ ∃y(x = n(y) ∧ F (y,do(δ, S A)))
iff r is the denotation of nk(0) and q is the denotation of nk+1(0). Therefore, by the successor state axiom for F it follows
that after one more B action, F is false in the resulting situation do(B,do(δ, S A)) for all the elements of the object domain
except for the denotation of nk+1(0). Therefore the induction holds. 
We now present the sentence φ∗ that we will use to prove Conjecture 1.
Deﬁnition 12. Let L be the language of the inﬁnite doors domain, and S A a macro for the situation term do(A, S0). φ∗ is
the following ﬁrst-order sentence of L:
∃x∀s(S A  s ⊃ ¬F (x, s)).
Sentence φ∗ expresses that there is a door x such that after action A is performed x will remain closed forever. First, we
show that the basic action theory D of the inﬁnite doors domain entails φ∗ . The intuition is that x is the unnamed object
that necessarily exists in all models of D.
Lemma 3. Let D be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain and φ∗ the ﬁrst-order sentence as in Deﬁnition 12. Then,
D | φ∗ .
Proof. Let M be a model of D. By Lemma 2 it follows that for every situation in the future of S A there can only be named
objects for which F is true. By Lemma 1 it follows that there exists at least one unnamed object q in the domain. Therefore
there is an x, namely the unnamed object q, such that F (x, s) is false in every situation in the future of S A , which implies
that M | φ∗ . Since M was arbitrary the lemma follows. 
Note that the sentence φ∗ is in LFS A , and that the original theory D entails φ∗ . We now proceed to show that a weak
progression Fα of D0 wrt A and D actually fails to entail φ∗ . First, we identify a weak progression Fα .
Lemma 4. Let D be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain of Deﬁnition 10 and Fα the following set of ﬁrst-order
sentences:{∀x(x = 0≡ F (x, S A)), (5), (6), (7)}.
Then, Fα is a weak progression ofD0 wrt the ground action A andD.
The proof is long and tedious and can be found in Appendix B. It involves a series of model-theoretic constructions using
properties of ﬁrst-order logic such as the upward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem of ﬁrst-order logic.
The set Fα is an updated version of the initial knowledge base of the basic action theory D of the inﬁnite doors domain.
The only difference is that the sentences about F are replaced by a sentence that expresses that there is exactly one door
that is open, namely the door zero. Intuitively this is what summarizes the effects of the action A as far as ﬁrst-order
entailment is concerned, and we would expect that this is suﬃcient for Fα to be a correct progression. Indeed, there are
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and for j > 0 the sentences ∃x(∧ j1 x = nk(0) ∧ ¬F (x, S A)), are all uniform in S A and are entailed both by D and Fα .
Nonetheless, there is a property of D0 that persists in S A which Fα fails to express, namely that there is an unnamed
object in every model. Of course, this is not reﬂected in any ﬁrst-order sentence uniform in S A that is entailed by D and
this is why Fα , which is deﬁned based on the ﬁrst-order entailments of D, fails to express it. Apparently, this property
is reﬂected though in a ﬁrst-order sentence that is about the future of S A , namely the sentence φ∗ of Deﬁnition 12. The
following lemma shows that Fα indeed fails to express this property and as a result (D−D0) ∪Fα fails to entail φ∗ .
Lemma 5. LetD be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain, φ∗ the ﬁrst-order sentence as in Deﬁnition 12, and Fα the set
of ﬁrst-order sentences as in Lemma 4. Then, (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ∗ .
Proof. Consider a model M of Fα that has the natural numbers as the domain for objects, and interprets the constant
symbol 0 as the number zero and the object function symbol n as the successor function. Note that it is easy to verify that
such a model exists by observing the four sentences that Fα consists of. M is a term model where the ground term nk(0)
is interpreted as the number k ∈ N. Observe that the property about F that we showed in Lemma 2 also holds for all the
models of (D−D0) ∪Fα . It follows that for every x in the object domain there is a sequence of actions after which F (x, s)
becomes true: x is the denotation of some term nk(0), therefore F (x,do(δ, S A)) is true when δ is a sequence of B actions
of size k. It follows that M | ∀x∃s(S A  s ∧ F (x, s)) which is equivalent to M | ¬φ∗ . 
Before moving on to state the main result of this section, it is important to observe that a strong progression DA actually
captures the property that there is an unnamed object in every model of D, and as a result (D −D0) ∪Dα entails φ∗ . To
see this more clearly, let us construct the sentence Pro(D, A) that is used in Deﬁnition 6. Recall that Pro(D, A) uses a set of
second-order variables to represent the sentences in D0, and an instantiated version of the successor state axioms in Dss in
order to model the transition from S0 to S A . Pro(D, A) is in fact the following second-order sentence:
∃Q .Q (0) ∧ ∀x(Q (x) ⊃ Q (n(x)))∧ ∃x¬Q (x) ∧ ψ ∧ ∀x(F (x, S A) ≡ x = 0), (10)
where ψ is the conjunction of the rigid sentences of D0, i.e., (5), (6), (7), and the successor state axiom is simpliﬁed
to include only the disjunct that refers to action A. As it should be obvious now, this sentence cannot be simpliﬁed to
ψ ∧ ∀x(F (x, S A) ≡ x = 0) which is the weak progression of Lemma 4.
The next theorem establishes that Conjecture 1 is indeed true and thus closes the open question about the correctness
of weak progression.
Theorem 2 (Weak progression is not correct wrt LFSα ). There is a basic action theory D, a ground action term α, and a ﬁrst-order
sentence φ about the future of Sα such thatD | φ but (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ , where Fα is a weak progression ofD0 wrt α andD.
Proof. Let D be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain, α be the constant action A, φ be the ﬁrst-order
sentence φ∗ of Deﬁnition 12, and Fα be the set of ﬁrst-order sentences of Lemma 4. The theorem follows from Lemmas 3,
4, and 5. 
This result shows a case where a weak progression Fα of D0 wrt α and D is not a correct progression wrt D0 wrt α, D,
and LFσ . Therefore it follows that weak progression is not correct in the general case. Moreover, it shows that any deﬁnition
of progression that relies on the ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα that are entailed by D would also fail to capture the
second-order property ∃Q .Q (0) ∧ ∀x(Q (x) ⊃ Q (n(x))) ∧ ∃x¬Q (x) that we identiﬁed in the inﬁnite doors domain and in
sentence (10).
We conclude with a lemma which shows that whenever a ﬁrst-order strong progression exists, it is actually logically
equivalent to a weak progression.
Lemma 6. Let D be a basic action theory with a ﬁnite D0 , α a ground action term, Dα a strong progression of D0 wrt α and D, and
Fα a weak progression ofD0 wrt α andD. ThenDα ∪Duna is logically equivalent to Fα ∪Duna.
Proof. By Deﬁnition 7 it follows that Fα ∪ Duna is a set of ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα and D | Fα ∪ Duna . By
Theorem 1 it then follows that
Dα ∪Duna |Fα ∪Duna.
Similarly, by Theorem 1 again and since Dα is a set of ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα it follows that D |Dα ∪Duna .
By Deﬁnition 7 it follows that
Fα ∪Duna |Dα ∪Duna. 
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In the previous section we showed that a weak progression Fα is not correct in the general case where the progressed
theory (D −D0) ∪Fα may be used to reason about unrestricted sentences about the future of Sα . In this section we will
show that a weak progression Fα is nonetheless correct wrt to a set that is wide enough to include sentences that are used
in (non-trivial) practical reasoning tasks. We start by reformulating a result in [3] about the simple projection problem and
then proceed with extending this result to a special case of the generalized projection problem.
6.1. Weak progression is correct wrt LRSα
The ability to predict how the world will be after performing a sequence of actions is the basis for other more complex
reasoning problems such as automated planning, scheduling, web-service composition, high-level program execution [6]. In
such settings the simple projection problem refers to determining whether some condition holds in a speciﬁc point in the
future, or in situation calculus terms whether the corresponding basic action theory entails a sentence that is uniform in
some situation term.
Lin and Reiter [3] showed that weak progression is correct wrt sentences of the simple projection problem. The result
follows by the properties of regression, an important computational mechanism that can be used to transform a sentence
uniform in σ to an equivalent one about S0. Here we introduce a slight generalization of regression and reformulate this
result in our notation.
Deﬁnition 13 (LRσ ). A ﬁrst-order formula φ in L is regressable wrt the situation term σ iff the following conditions hold:
1. every term of sort situation mentioned in φ is rooted at σ ;
2. for every atom of the form Poss(α,κ) that appears in φ, α has the form A(
t), where A is some n-ary action function
symbol;
3. φ does not quantify over situations;
4. φ does not mention the predicate symbol  and it does not mention any equality atom built on situation terms.
We deﬁne LRσ as the set of all ﬁrst-order sentences in L that are regressable wrt σ .
The set of regressable formulas wrt S0 is exactly the set of regressable formulas as deﬁned in [5], while the set of
regressable formulas wrt some ground term σ is the subset that can also be regressed down to σ .
Example 2. Consider the language of the inﬁnite doors domain of Deﬁnition 10. The sentence F (0,do(A, S0)) ∧
F (0,do(B, S0)) is regressable wrt S0 but it is not regressable wrt do(A, S0), while the sentence F (0,do(A, S0)) ∧
F (0,do(B,do(A, S0))) is regressable wrt both S0 and do(A, S0).
We introduce the regression operator Rσ for formulas that are regressable wrt σ . Rσ works exactly the same as the
operator R deﬁned in [5] regressing atoms according to the precondition and successor state axioms in D, except that it
only does so until a formula uniform in σ is obtained. Similar to the operator R, the following result can be obtained
for Rσ .
Lemma 7. LetD be a basic action theory and φ a ﬁrst-order sentence that is regressable wrt the ground situation term σ . Then,Rσ (φ)
is a ﬁrst-order sentence uniform in σ such thatD | φ iffD |Rσ (φ).
Proof. By induction over a suitable well-founded ordering relation similar to the proof of result [14, Theorem 2]. The
inductive argument and the details of the ordering relation are exactly the same except for the fact that the base case
corresponds to a formula uniform in σ . 
In particular this result also holds when instead of D we have a progressed theory (D−D0) ∪Fα .
Lemma 8. Let D be a basic action theory, α a ground action term, and Fα a weak progression of D0 wrt α and D. Let φ be a ﬁrst-
order sentence that is regressable wrt Sα . Then, RSα (φ) is a ﬁrst-order sentence uniform in Sα such that (D − D0) ∪ Dα | φ iff
(D−D0) ∪Dα |Rσ (φ).
Proof. The same proof method as the one for Lemma 7 applies. 
Using the previous result about the simple projection problem and these lemmas it is easy to show that a weak progres-
sion is correct wrt the set of ﬁrst-order sentences that are regressable wrt Sα .
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ofD0 wrt α andD. Then Fα is a correct progression ofD0 wrt α,D, and LRSα .
Proof. Let φ be a ﬁrst-order sentence that is regressable wrt Sα . It suﬃces to show that D | φ iff (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ. By
Lemma 7 it follows that the sentence RSα (φ) is uniform in Sα and D | φ iff D |RSα (φ). By the result [3, Proposition 4.3]
that a weak progression is correct wrt sentences uniform in some situation term, it follows that D | φ iff (D−D0)∪Fα |
RSα (φ). By Lemma 8 and since D and (D−D0)∪Fα share the same Dss , it follows that D | φ iff (D−D0)∪Fα | φ. 
We now proceed to show that a weak progression is correct with respect to a much wider class of sentences that may
also quantify over situations.
6.2. Weak progression is correct wrt LQSα
While the simple projection task refers to determining whether some condition holds in a speciﬁc point in the future,
the generalized projection problem refers to conditions about several points in the future such as questions of achievability,
i.e., “Is there a way to open all doors in the domain of inﬁnite doors?”, and invariants, i.e., “Will the door 0 remain closed
forever after this action is performed?”. We deﬁne the set LQσ of ﬁrst-order sentences that includes an “un-nested” form of
such questions as follows.
Deﬁnition 14 (LQσ ). Let σ be a ground situation term. Then, LQσ is the smallest set such that the following conditions hold:
1. if the ﬁrst-order formula φ(s) is regressable wrt s then the sentences φ(σ ) and ∀s(σ  s ⊃ φ(s)) are in LQσ ;
2. if the ﬁrst-order sentences φ,ψ are in LQσ then the sentences ¬φ and φ ∧ ψ are also in LQσ .
The set LQσ is a subset of LFσ that restricts the way quantiﬁers for situation variables can be nested. The following
example illustrates this.
Example 3. Consider the language of the inﬁnite doors domain of Deﬁnition 10, and the sentence φ∗ of Deﬁnition 12:
∃x∀s(S A  s ⊃ ¬F (x, s)),
φ∗ is an example of a sentence in LFS A but not in L
Q
SA
. Now let φ be the following sentence:
∀s(S A  s ⊃ ∃x¬F (x, s)).
Observe that φ is in LFS A and it is also in L
Q
SA
. The same holds for ¬φ and Boolean combinations of similar invariants that
allow quantiﬁcation over objects to appear only inside the scope of the quantiﬁcation over situations.
The intuition is that a weak progression is correct with respect to the sentences in LQσ , where σ is the situation that D0
is progressed to. In other words, for every sentence φ in LQSα , (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ iff D | φ. In order to prove this we ﬁrst
identify a suﬃcient condition that refers to the models of the two theories. This is stated formally in the following lemma:
Lemma 10. Let D be a basic action theory, α a ground action term, Fα a weak progression of D0 wrt α and D, and  a set of
ﬁrst-order sentences in L. Let M be a model ofD and M ′ a model of (D−D0) ∪Fα . If the following holds for all M, M ′:
for all ﬁrst-order sentences φ uniform in Sα , M | φ iff M ′ | φ , implies that for all φ in , M | φ iff M ′ | φ ,
then it follows that: for all φ ∈ ,D | φ iff (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ .
This lemma is very important as it speciﬁes a method for proving that a weak progression is correct with respect to
a class of sentences . Essentially, it reduces the question that the two theories entail the same set of sentences in 
provided they entail the same set of sentences uniform in Sα , to a simpler question about the models of the theories, i.e.,
any two models of the theories satisfy the same set of sentences in  provided they satisfy the same set of sentences
uniform in Sα .
The proof of Lemma 10 can be found in Appendix C along with two other results that are needed. In particular, the proof
relies on the existing result that the second-order part of a basic action theory, namely the set Dfnd , can be safely omitted
when reasoning about formulas uniform in some situation argument, as well as a new non-trivial result (Lemma 15) that
involves a non-constructive argument and the Compactness Theorem of ﬁrst-order logic.
So, with Lemma 10 at hand, in order to show that a weak progression is correct with respect to LQσ it suﬃces to prove
the following lemma:
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and D. Let M be a model of D and M ′ be a model of (D −D0) ∪Fα such that for all sentences φ uniform in Sα , M | φ iff M ′ | φ .
Then, for all φ in LQσ , M | φ iff M ′ | φ .
Proof. By induction on the construction of formulas φ in LQσ . The only interesting part is the base of the induction where
we have two cases: (i) φ is regressable wrt Sα ; and (ii) φ is ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ ψ(s)), where ψ(s) is regressable wrt s. The ﬁrst
case follows from Lemma 9. For the second case we will use a trick to deal with the quantiﬁcation over situations and
reduce it to the ﬁrst case. We show the (⇒) direction by contradiction and the other one follows similarly.
Let M | ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ ψ(s)) where ψ(s) is regressable wrt s and suppose that M ′ | ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ ψ(s)). It follows that
there is an element q of the situation domain such that M ′,μsq | Sα  s ∧ ¬ψ(s). Since M ′ satisﬁes the foundational
axioms Dfnd , this element q is reachable from the denotation of Sα by a ﬁnite number of applications of the function do.
In particular let e1, . . . , en be elements of the action domain such that do
M′ (〈e1, . . . , en〉, SM′α ) = q. It follows that M ′ | γ ,
where γ is the following sentence:
∃a1 · · · ∃an ¬ψ
(
do
(〈a1, . . . ,an〉, Sα)).
By the hypothesis ψ(s) is regressable wrt s and so γ is regressable wrt Sα . By case (i) it follows that M | γ . Since M
satisﬁes the foundational axioms Dfnd , it follows that M | ∃s(Sα  s∧¬ψ(s)) or equivalently M | ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ ψ(s)) which
is a contradiction. Thus our assumption is wrong and M ′ | ∀s(Sα  s ⊃ ψ(s)). 
Now we are ready to state and prove the main theorem of the section.
Theorem 3 (Weak progression is correct wrt LQSα ). LetD be a basic action theory, α a ground action term, andFα a weak progression
ofD0 wrt α andD. Then Fα is a correct progression ofD0 wrt α,D, and LQSα .
Proof. Let  be LQSα . The theorem follows by Lemmas 10 and 11. 
This result shows that even though it may be the case that a ﬁrst-order strong progression cannot be found, we can still
use a (ﬁrst-order) weak progression for our reasoning purposes and it is guaranteed that it will be correct wrt a wide class
of sentences. This result establishes that this form of progression is actually more useful than what was originally believed.
7. Related work
This paper revises results that ﬁrst appeared in Vassos and Levesque [1]. The title follows the line of work of Lin and
Reiter [2,3]. The notion of progression for basic action theories was ﬁrst introduced by Lin and Reiter in their seminal
paper [3]. The version we use here is due to Vassos et al. [15] that follows the same intuitions but is based on logical
equivalence instead of model theoretical notions. For a more detailed discussion about the syntactic and aesthetic differences
between the deﬁnitions of progression as they appear in [3,5], and in this paper, the reader is referred to Appendix A.
There is a lot of work in specifying restrictions on the theories so that a correct progression is always deﬁnable in
ﬁrst-order logic. Lin and Reiter [3] were ﬁrst to investigate syntactical restrictions on the successor state axioms as they in-
troduced the context-free assumption for actions and showed that a ﬁrst-order strong progression can be computed. Liu and
Levesque [16] introduced the local-effect assumption for actions where they proposed a weaker version of progression that
is logically incomplete, but remains practical. Vassos et al. [15] later showed that under this assumption a ﬁrst-order strong
progression can be computed by updating a ﬁnite initial knowledge base. Some more recent work shows that a ﬁrst-order
strong progression can be achieved under conditions also for actions that go beyond the local-effect assumption [17–19], as
well as for a special form of knowledge bases that include functional ﬂuents [20], and in an epistemic setting [21].
Other people have looked into deﬁnitions for the progression of basic action theories under different assumptions. Liu
and Levesque [16] study the special case where the domain of discourse is ﬁxed to a countable set of named objects,
while Claßen and Lakemeyer [22] focus on the ES variant of the situation calculus. Outside of the situation calculus but
in a similar logical formalism, Thielscher [23] deﬁnes a dual representation for the basic action theories based on state
update axioms that explicitly deﬁne the direct effects of each action. Unlike our work where the initial knowledge base is
replaced by an updated version, there, the update relies on expressing the changes using constraints which may need to be
conjoined to the original knowledge base. Finally, a similar but weaker result is due to Shirazi and Amir [24]. Shirazi and
Amir proposed logical ﬁltering as a way to progress the initial knowledge base and proved that their method is correct for
answering queries of a certain form.
Finally, with respect to the proof for Conjecture 1, it should be noted that the notion of unnamed objects was also used
in a different way in [3] to show that a ﬁrst-order strong progression does not always exist.
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In this paper we focused on a technical problem in the ﬁeld of reasoning about action and change in the context of
the situation calculus. We examined two deﬁnitions that exist in the literature for the notion of progression, namely the
deﬁnition of a strong progression that is based on a second-order construct, and that of a weak progression that is based
on the ﬁrst-order entailments of the original theory.
We were able to prove a major result (Theorem 2) that resolves a problem that has been open since it was ﬁrst identiﬁed
by Lin and Reiter in [3], namely that a weak progression is too weak, as it is not a correct progression in the general case.
The consequence of this result is that in the general case we cannot always ﬁnd a ﬁrst-order progression that is also a
correct progression: a strong progression may necessarily be second-order while a weak progression may be incorrect.
This is not a surprising result as every basic action theory includes a second-order inductive axiom that is necessary
when we reason about all the possible future situations. What was not clear until now, though, is how this inductive
axiom may be used implicitly to construct a ﬁrst-order sentence that quantiﬁes over situations in a way that captures a
second-order property that cannot be expressed in any ﬁrst-order sentence that does not quantify over situations.
Nonetheless, in practice we are not only interested in the most general case for the reasoning tasks we can perform
with basic action theories. In fact, in special cases the simpler deﬁnition of weak progression may be a preferred option as
long as it is guaranteed that it is correct. In this paper we were also able to prove an important positive result toward this
direction.
Our result (Theorem 3) shows that a weak progression is always correct wrt reasoning about a large class of sentences,
including some that quantify over situations, in particular sentences that express questions of achievability and invariants.
This is an important result that shows that even though it may be the case that a ﬁrst-order strong progression cannot be
found, we can still use a (ﬁrst-order) weak progression for our reasoning purposes and it is guaranteed that it will be correct
wrt a wide class of sentences. Moreover, we provided a general method for proving the correctness of weak progression
that can be used under different assumptions (Lemma 10).
Appendix A. A note on the various deﬁnitions of progression in the literature
Lin and Reiter were ﬁrst to formally characterize when a set Dα qualiﬁes as a progression of D0 [3, Deﬁnition 4.1]. In
this seminal paper Lin and Reiter gave a model-theoretic deﬁnition for Dα and proved that their deﬁnition is always correct.
In their deﬁnition they required that the models of Dα have a speciﬁc relation with the models of D as far as the situation
Sα is concerned.
An important detail about the deﬁnition of progression by Lin and Reiter is that it is based on a slightly different version
of the basic action theories than the ones we consider nowadays. In particular, the successor state axioms in [3] had the
following form:
Poss(a, s) ⊃ F (
x,do(a, s))≡ Φ(
x,a, s),
that is, it should be the case that the action α is executable in S0 in order for Sα to be affected in any way. Therefore,
the model-theoretic deﬁnition of progression they provided also accounted for the occurrence of Poss in the successor state
axioms. For example, if α is not possible in S0 then the models of D are such that S0 and Sα are identical. It follows that
the models of Dα need to reﬂect this as well.
Another subtle detail is that the model-theoretic deﬁnition by Lin and Reiter requires that Dα entails Duna . This require-
ment and the effect of Poss is illustrated in their result about the second-order deﬁnability of progression [3, Theorem 2]:
they were able to prove that when D0 is a ﬁnite set, then the set Duna along with a particular second-order sentence
that mentions Poss always qualiﬁes as a progression of D0. The deﬁnition of progression of [3] also implies that any two
progressions of D0 are logically equivalent. As a result it follows that Dα necessarily includes Duna or a logically equivalent
representation of Duna .
In this paper we chose to deﬁne the progression of D0 using the second-order sentence that was introduced by Lin and
Reiter. The reason is that it is often easier to work with a second-order sentence than a model-theoretic relation between
theories. In order to use their result though, we had to remove the dependency on Poss as in the deﬁnition of the basic
action theories that we use the predicate Poss is not mentioned in the successor state axioms. This was in fact easy as we
only had to remove the left-hand side of the implication of the second-order sentence of [3]. Intuitively this implies that
the situations progress as if Poss(a, s) is always true.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that it is not aesthetically nice to include Duna in Dα knowing that Duna is already included in D. In
other words, since Dα includes a logically equivalent representation of Duna , the updated basic action theory (D−D0)∪Dα
essentially includes Duna twice. In order to prevent this we also removed the dependency on Duna so that the progression
of D0 corresponds to a more intuitive set that does not include information that is implied by Duna unless it is necessary
for specifying the situation Sα .
So, the deﬁnition of a strong progression is essentially the original deﬁnition of progression by Lin and Reiter [3] applied
to the newer form of basic action theories that do not use Poss in the successor state axioms. In fact, the correctness of
strong progression follows from the results in [3] in the sense that we can follow the same reasoning as in the proofs of
Lin and Reiter with only slight changes that correspond to the two points we mentioned about Poss and Duna .
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the deﬁnition of progression that appears in [5, Deﬁnition 9.1.1]. This is also model-theoretic, more compact than the original
deﬁnition by Lin and Reiter, and also accounts for the aesthetic issue we noted about the set Duna . This deﬁnition of Dα
requires that the models of (D −D0) ∪Dα instead of the models of Dα have a speciﬁc relation with the models of D as
far as the situations in the future of Sα are concerned. Nonetheless the deﬁnition in [5] suffers from the following problem:
it allows two sets that are not logically equivalent to both qualify as a progression of D0. Unfortunately we can no longer
then assume that Dα is unique up to logical equivalence which in some sense means that Dα is not well-deﬁned.
For instance consider the case where D0 is the empty set and consider the action A that makes F (s) true and does not
affect any other ﬂuent. The successor state axiom for F is then the following:
F
(
do(a, s)
)≡ (a = A ∨ F (s)).
According to the deﬁnition in [5] it is not too diﬃcult to show that the set{
F
(
do(A, S0)
)}
is a progression of D0, which is indeed the intended progression of D0. Unfortunately, there is one more set that qualiﬁes as
a progression of D0, one that is not intended to qualify as a progression. Let Dα be the empty set. Then it is trivial to show
that Dα is a progression of D0 according to the deﬁnition in [5] simply because D and (D−D0)∪Dα are identical as both
D0 and Dα are empty. So, in this simple example the empty set and the set {F (do(A, S0))} both qualify as a progression of
D0 with respect to the deﬁnition in [5] but they are clearly not logically equivalent. Note that this cannot arise in the case
of strong progression or the original deﬁnition by Lin and Reiter.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 4
We ﬁrst present a lemma that shows a particular relation between the models of two ﬁrst-order theories Σ1, Σ2 and
their entailments with respect to a set of ﬁrst-order sentences Γ . The intuition is that this lemma also applies when Σ1 is
a basic action theory D without the set Dfnd of the foundational axioms and Σ2 is a progression of D0 according to some
appropriate deﬁnition.
Lemma 12. Let Σ1 , Σ2 , Γ be sets of ﬁrst-order or second-order sentences of the situation calculus language L. If for every model M1
of Σ1 , there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that M1 and M2 satisfy the same set of sentences in Γ , then the following holds: for all φ in Γ ,
if Σ2 | φ then Σ1 | φ .
Proof. Let φ be an arbitrary sentence in Γ and assume that Σ2 | φ. Let M1 be an arbitrary model of Σ1. By the hypothesis
of the lemma it follows that there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that M1 and M2 satisfy the same set of sentences in Γ . By
the assumption that Σ2 | φ it follows that M2 | φ, and since φ is in Γ it follows that M1 | φ. Since M1 was arbitrary it
follows that Σ1 | φ. 
Lemma 4. Let D be the basic action theory of the inﬁnite doors domain of Deﬁnition 10 and Fα the following set of ﬁrst-order
sentences:{∀x(x = 0≡ F (x, S A)), (5), (6), (7)}.
Then, Fα is a weak progression ofD0 wrt the ground action A andD.
Proof. By Deﬁnition 7 we need to show that for all ﬁrst-order sentences φ uniform in S A , Fα ∪Duna | φ iff D | φ.
For the (⇒) direction we proceed as follows. The theory D entails the successor state axiom for F therefore also entails
the sentence we get by replacing s by S0 and a by A:
D | ∀x F (x,do(A, S0))≡ A = A ∧ x = 0∨
A = B ∧ ¬F (x, S0) ∧ ∃y
(
x = n(y) ∧ F (y, S0)
)
.
By the axioms for equality and the sentence (4), i.e., A = B , it follows that
D | ∀x x = 0≡ F (x, S A).
It is clear that D | {(5), (6), (7)} as these are axioms of D. Therefore
D | {∀x(x = 0≡ F (x, S A)), (5), (6), (7)}.
It follows that D | Fα ∪Duna . Now let φ be a ﬁrst-order sentence uniform in S A and assume that Fα ∪Duna | φ. Then
since D |Fα ∪Duna and Fα ∪Duna | φ it follows that D | φ.
For the (⇐) direction the case is more complicated. Let Σ1 be the set Fα ∪ Duna , Σ2 the set D, and Γ the set of
ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in S A . Then by Lemma 12 it suﬃces to show that for every model M of Fα ∪Duna , there is
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Based on Deﬁnition 11 of named and unnamed objects we distinguish two cases for: (i) M has at least one element in the
object domain that is unnamed, and (ii) all the elements of the object domain of M are named. For both cases we will
show that there is a model M ′ of D such that M and M ′ satisfy the same set of sentences in Γ . For the ﬁrst case we
appeal to a natural construction, while the second case will be reduced to the ﬁrst one by appropriate application of the
Löwenheim–Skolem theorem.
Case (i): M |Fα ∪Duna and M has at least one element in the object domain that is unnamed. We construct the model
M ′ as follows.
1. M ′ has the same domains for sort object and action as M .
2. M ′ has a domain of strings Sit for the situation sort that is deﬁned as follows. Sit includes the string “S0” and it is
the smallest set that is closed under the string operation that produces the string “do(a, s)”, where a can be either the
string “A” or the string “B” and s is any string in Sit. M ′ interprets  as the sub-string relation between strings.
3. M ′ interprets 0,n, A, B exactly as M .
4. M ′ interprets S0,do such that every situation term σ in L is interpreted to the corresponding string “σ ” in Sit.
5. M ′,μxq | F (x, S0), for all q in the object domain of M ′ such that q is named.
6. M ′,μxq | F (x, S0), for all q in the object domain of M ′ such that q is unnamed.
7. For all q in the object domain of M ′ (or equivalently the object domain of M), M ′,μxq | F (x, S A) iff M,μxq | F (x, S A).
8. For all the elements of Sit other than “S0” and “do(A, S0)” let the interpretation of F (x, s) be the one that is deﬁned by
the successor state axiom for F and the interpretation of F (x, S0), F (x, S A).
9. M ′ | ∀a∀sPoss(a, s).
By the construction of M ′ and in particular by the points 1, 3, 7 and by induction on the construction of the ﬁrst-order
formulas uniform in S A it follows that for all sentences φ in Γ , M | φ iff M ′ | φ. We now proceed to show also that M ′
is a model of D, that is, M ′ satisﬁes the sentences (1) to (7) as they appear in Deﬁnition 10, as well as the foundational
axioms Dfnd for basic action theories.
• Sentences (1), (2): Poss(A, s) ≡ true, Poss(B, s) ≡ true.
By point 9 it follows that M ′ | (1) and M ′ | (2).
• Sentence (3):
F
(
x,do(a, s)
)≡ a = A ∧ x = 0∨
a = B ∧ ¬F (x, s) ∧ ∃y(x = n(y) ∧ F (y, s)).
Let Φ(x,a, s) be the formula on the right-hand side of the logical symbol ≡ in the sentence (3). By the point 8 it follows
that for all variable assignments μ except for μ′ which interprets do(a, s) as “do(A, S0)”, M ′,μ | ∀x.F (x,do(a, s)) ≡
Φ(x,a, s). By the point 7 and since M is a model of Fα ∪Duna it follows that M ′ | ∀x.x = 0 ≡ F (x,do(A, S0)) which
implies that M ′,μ′ | ∀x.F (x,do(a, s)) ≡ Φ(x,a, s). Therefore, M ′ | (3).
• Sentences (4), (5), (6), (7): A = B , ∀a a = A ∨ a = B , ∀x x = 0≡ ∃y n(y) = x, ∀x∀y n(x) = n(y) ⊃ x = y.
M |Fα ∪Duna therefore M | {(4), (5), (6), (7)}. By the points 1, 3 it follows that M ′ | {(4), (5), (6), (7)}.
• Sentence (8): F (0, S0) ∧ ∀x(F (x, S0) ⊃ F (n(x), S0)).
By the points 5 and 6 it follows that M ′ | (8).
• Sentence (9): ∃x ¬F (x, S0).
By the point 6 and the fact that in the case (i) that we consider here there is an unnamed object in the domain, it
follows that M ′ | (9).
• Dfnd . By the point 2 it follows that M ′ |Dfnd .
Thus, M ′ |D.
Case (ii): M | Fα ∪ Duna and all the elements of the object domain of M are named. For this case we will use the
Löwenheim–Skolem theorem of ﬁrst-order logic to show that there is structure Mc that satisﬁes the same set of sentences
in Γ as M but also has unnamed objects. We can then construct M ′ in the same way as for the case (i) so that M ′ is a
model of D and satisﬁes the same set of sentences in Γ as Mc (and thus satisﬁes the same set of sentences in Γ as M).
Even though the intuition for the construction of Mc is relatively simple, the actual construction involves several tedious
intermediate steps. In particular, in order to use the (upward) Löwenheim–Skolem theorem we’ll need to transform the
three-sorted model M into a normal one-sorted model M1 in a way that the satisfaction of formulas is preserved, then
apply the theorem to get an elementarily equivalent model M2 with unnamed objects, and then transform M2 to a model
Mc of the three-sorted situation calculus language. The formal details follow.
Let L∗ be the (one-sorted) ﬁrst-order language that consists of the constant symbols 0, A, B , the unary function sym-
bol n, the unary predicate symbols P , Q , and the countably inﬁnite number of variables a,a1,a2, . . . and x, x1, x2, . . . . The
predicate symbol P will be used to encode the truth of the ﬂuent atoms of the form F (t, S A) and the predicate Q will be
used to specify a subset of the domain that will be used as the action domain in L∗ . The variables x, x1, . . . will be used to
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extension of Q . In particular let L∗S A be the smallest set of formulas in L∗ such that the following conditions hold:
• for every predicate atom P (t) such that the term t is of the form nk(0) or t is one of the variables x, x1, x2, . . . , P (t) is
in L∗S A ;
• for every equality atom t1 = t2 such that t1, t2 are terms of the form nk(0) or one of the variables x, x1, x2, . . . , t1 = t2
is in L∗S A ;• for every equality atom t1 = t2 such that t1, t2 are one of the constants A, B or one of the variables a,a1,a2, . . . , t1 = t2
is in L∗S A ;• if φ,ψ are in L∗S A then ¬φ, φ ∧ ψ , ∀xφ, and ∀a Q (a) ⊃ φ are in L∗S A .
For every formula φ in Γ let φ∗ be φ with each ﬂuent atom of the form F (t, S A) replaced by the atom P (t) and each
action quantiﬁer of the form ∀aψ replaced by ∀aQ (a) ⊃ φ. It is not diﬃcult to show that if φ is in Γ then φ∗ is in L∗S A and
similarly that we can do the inverse transformation in order to obtain a formula in Γ from a formula in L∗S A .
We now construct a structure M1 of the language L∗ such that the following hold.
1. M1 has the object domain of M as its domain and interprets n,0 in the same way as M .
2. M1 interprets A as the denotation of 0, B to the denotation of n(0), and the extension of Q is such that Q (a) is true
only for the denotations of 0 and n(0).
3. For all q in the domain of M1 (or equivalently the object domain of M), M1,μxq | P (x) iff M,μxq | F (x, S A).
Let g1 be a function from the action domain of M to the set {AM1 , BM1 } such that g1 maps the denotation of A in M
to the denotation of A in M1 and similarly for B . Since M models the sentences (4) and (5) it follows that the domain of
actions for M has exactly two elements and so g1 is a bijection. Let h1 be the extension of g1 that also maps each of the
elements of the object domain of M to the identical element in the domain of M1. The mapping h1 is a bijection with the
obvious deﬁnition for the inverse mapping. By induction then on the construction of the ﬁrst-order formulas uniform in S A
it follows that for all ﬁrst-order formulas φ uniform in S A , M,μ | φ iff M1,h1(μ) | φ∗ . Therefore it follows that for all
sentences φ in Γ ,
M | φ iff M1 | φ∗. (B.1)
By the (upward) Löwenheim–Skolem theorem of ﬁrst-order logic it follows that there is a structure M2 of the language
L∗ such that M1 and M2 are elementarily equivalent (i.e. they satisfy the same set of sentences in L∗) but M1 and M2 are
not isomorphic; in particular the domain of M2 has a greater cardinality than the domain of M1. So there is a model M2 of
the language L∗ such that the following conditions hold.
1. The cardinality of the domain of M2 is greater than the cardinality of the domain of M1.
2. For all φ∗ ∈L∗ ,
M1 | φ∗ iff M2 | φ∗. (B.2)
By the assumption we did for the case (ii) all the objects in the domain of M are named by some term in L of the form
nk(0) and so by the point 1 in the construction of M1 and the fact that L∗ includes the symbols n,0 it follows that all the
objects in the domain of M1 are also named by some term in L∗ . Since the set of all terms of L∗ is countable this implies
that the domain of M1 is also countable. Now since the cardinality of the domain of M2 is greater than the cardinality
of domain of M1 this implies that the domain of M2 is uncountable. Since the set of all terms of L∗ is countable it then
follows that there is at least one unnamed object in M2.
Based on the L∗-structure M2 we will now construct an L-structure Mc that satisﬁes the same set of sentences in Γ as
M but also has at least one unnamed object. We construct Mc as follows.
1. Mc has the domain of M2 as the object domain and interprets n, 0 exactly as M2.
2. Mc has the domain {AM2 , BM2 } as the action domain and interprets A, B exactly as M2.
3. Mc has the set of strings {“S”} as the domain for sort situation and interprets all situation terms as the string “S”.
4. For all q in the object domain of Mc (or equivalently the domain of M2), Mc,μxq | F (x, S A) iff M2,μxq | P (x).
The set of ground terms of sort object in L is a subset of the set of ground terms of L∗ . By the fact that there is at least
one unnamed object in the domain of M2 and point 1 in the construction of Mc it follows that there is at least one element
of the object domain of Mc that is unnamed. So in order to complete the proof we only need to show that Mc satisﬁes the
same set of sentences in L∗S A as M . Let g2 be a function from the action domain of Mc to the set {AM2 , BM2 } such that
g2 maps the denotation of A in Mc to the denotation of A in M2 and the same for B . Similarly to the deﬁnition of h1 let
h2 be the extension of g2 that also maps each of the elements of the object domain of Mc to the identical element in the
domain of M2. The mapping h2 is a bijection with the obvious deﬁnition for the inverse mapping. By induction then on the
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M2,h2(μ) | φ∗ . Therefore it follows that for every sentence φ in Γ ,
Mc | φ iff M2 | φ∗. (B.3)
By (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3) it then follows that for all sentences φ in Γ , M | φ iff Mc | φ which reduces the case (ii) to the
case (i). 
Appendix C. Proof of Lemma 10
Before we proceed to the proof of Lemma 10 we need to establish some results about important properties of basic
action theories.
As it has been shown in [3,14] the foundational axioms are only needed when a formula quantiﬁes over the situation
space, otherwise they can be omitted. This is an important property as the set Dfnd of the foundational axioms is the only
place where a second-order axiom is used, therefore D −Dfnd is a purely ﬁrst-order theory. We extend this result slightly
for our purposes as follows.
Lemma 13. LetD be a basic action theory. Given any model M− ofD−Dfnd, there is a model ofD such that the following hold:
1. M− and M have the same domains for sorts action and object, and interpret all situation independent predicates and functions
the same;
2. for any ground situation term σ , any ﬁrst-order formula φ uniform in σ , and any variable assignmentμ, M,μ | φ iff M−,μ | φ.
Proof. By [3, Proposition 3.1] and induction on the construction of ﬁrst-order formulas φ that are uniform in some situation
term σ . 
This implies that when φ is uniform in some situation term σ , the set Dfnd is not needed to decide whether φ is entailed
by the basic action theory.
Lemma 14. LetD be a basic action theory. Then, for any ground situation term σ and any ﬁrst-order formula φ uniform in σ ,D | φ
iff (D−Dfnd) | φ.
The following lemma shows that if Σ1 and Σ2 entail the same set of sentences in Γ then for every model of one theory
we can always ﬁnd a model of the other such that the two models satisfy the same set of sentences in Γ . Intuitively this
might seem like an obvious fact but the proof is actually not straightforward and involves a non-constructive argument that
makes use of the Compactness Theorem of ﬁrst-order logic.
Lemma 15. Let Σ1 , Σ2 , Γ be sets of ﬁrst-order sentences of the situation calculus language L such that the following two conditions
hold:
1. Γ is closed under logical conjunction and negation;
2. for all φ in Γ , Σ1 | φ iff Σ2 | φ .
Then for every model M1 of Σ1 , there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that for all φ in Γ , M1 | φ iff M2 | φ .
Proof. We prove by contradiction as follows. Suppose otherwise. Then there is a model M1 of Σ1 such that there is no
model M2 of Σ2 so that for all sentences φ in Γ , M1 | φ iff M2 | φ. Equivalently, there is a model M1 of Σ1 such that for
every model M2 of Σ2 there is some sentence ψ in Γ so that M1 | ψ but M2 | ψ .7 Let  be the following set:
{ψ: ψ ∈ Γ and there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that M1 | ψ but M2 | ψ}.
Clearly  is consistent as M1 | . Moreover there is no model M2 of Σ2 that satisﬁes  since for each model M2 there
is at least one sentence ψ in  such that M ′ | ψ . Therefore Σ2 ∪ |. By the Compactness Theorem for ﬁrst-order logic
we get that there is a ﬁnite subset of , ′ , such that Σ2 ∪ ′ |. Let γ be the conjunction of all sentences in ′ . Then
Σ2 ∪ {γ } | which implies that Σ2 | ¬γ .
Since Γ is closed under logical conjunction and negation, γ ∈ Γ as it is a conjunction of sentences in Γ and also ¬γ ∈ Γ .
By point 2 in the hypothesis Σ1 and Σ2 entail the same set of sentences in Γ therefore we also get that Σ1 | ¬γ . Note
that this yields a contradiction because M1 is a model of Σ1 and M1 satisﬁes γ . 
Now we can proceed to the proof of Lemma 10.
7 Note that if instead of this there is a sentence ψ ′ in Γ so that M1 | ψ ′ but M2 | ψ ′ we can just take ψ to be ¬ψ ′ .
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ﬁrst-order sentences in L. Let M be a model ofD and M ′ a model of (D−D0) ∪Fα . If the following holds for all M, M ′:
for all ﬁrst-order sentences φ uniform in Sα , M | φ iff M ′ | φ , implies that for all φ in , M | φ iff M ′ | φ ,
then it follows that: for all φ ∈ ,D | φ iff (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ .
Proof. For the (⇐) direction we proceed as follows. Since Fα is a set of ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα and (D−D0)∪
Fα |Fα , by the result [3, Proposition 4.3] that a weak progression is correct wrt sentences uniform in some situation term,
it follows that D |Fα . Therefore D | (D−D0) ∪Fα and as a result for all φ in , if (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ, then D | φ.
For the (⇒) direction we proceed as follows. Let Σ1 be the theory (D−D0 −Dfnd) ∪Fα , Σ2 the theory D−Dfnd , and
Γ the set of all the ﬁrst-order sentences uniform in Sα . By the result [3, Proposition 4.3] that a weak progression is correct
wrt sentences uniform in some situation term, it follows that for all φ in Γ , (D−D0)∪Fα | φ iff D | φ and by Lemma 14
it follows that for all φ in Γ , Σ1 | φ iff Σ2 | φ. The set Γ is clearly closed under conjunction and negation, and so by
Lemma 15 it follows that for every model M1 of Σ1, there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that for all φ in Γ , M1 | φ iff M2 | φ.
Since a model of (D −D0) ∪Fα must satisfy (D −D0 −Dfnd) ∪Fα it follows that for every model M1 of (D−D0) ∪Fα ,
there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that for all φ in Γ , M1 | φ iff M2 | φ. By Lemma 13 it follows that for every model M1
of (D−D0) ∪Fα , there is a model M2 of D such that for all φ in Γ , M1 | φ iff M2 | φ. By the assumption of the lemma
about the models of the theories it follows that for every model M1 of (D−D0)∪Fα , there is a model M2 of Σ2 such that
for all φ in , M1 | φ iff M2 | φ. Now, let Σ ′1 be (D −D0) ∪Fα , Σ ′2 to be D. Then by Lemma 12 it follows that for all
φ ∈ , if D | φ then (D−D0) ∪Fα | φ. 
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